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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DEFAMATION
AND PRIVACY: BUTTS AND WALKER
The clash between the first amendment freedoms of speech and
press, and the common law protections of privacy) name, and reputa-
tion, has resulted in a federal law of defamation and privacy. In New
York Times Go. v. Sullivan,' the Stipreme Court declared that the Con-
stitution demands the formulation of federal guidelines limiting the
permissible scope of defamation and privacy actions. Thus, the Court
announced
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relatiig to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"--that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.2
Unfortunately, the creation or expansion of one right necessarily
tolls the demise or confinement of another. The New York Times ruile
was formulated "against the background of a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be un-
inhibited, robust, and wide-open .... ,3 In theory, protectiot of the
listener is more vital than protection of the speaker.4 Though some
abuse is inherent in the protection itself, even false statemerits must
be protected it the freedom of expression is to be given the breathing
space it requires for survival. Where malice is present, however, the
shield may be lifted, because democracy has no interest in defending
the calculated misstatement.5
I
THm EvoLu±ION OF New York Times
Even when New York Times was decided, it was clear that the
Court had barely begun to plow inroads into the personal protections
previously afforded by defamation and privacy actions.6 In the mean-
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Id. at 279-80.
s Id. at 270.
4 A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FRaa.om 57 (1960).
5 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)4
6 Justice Douglas has said, "mhe right of privacy, greatly cherished in the
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time, uncertain of the dimensions of the new rule, lower federal courts
and state courts were left to wade through the resultant judicial quag-
mire.
Foreseeing the future growth of the rule the Court had laid down,
a majority of post-New York Times lower court decisions adopted an
expansionistic interpretation. The rule was immediately extended to
include appointed officials, such as a police lieutenant who served as
deputy chief of detectives7 and the chairman of a county Democratic
primary board.8 It was also applied to candidates for public office. 9 One
case went so far as to find a partner in the mayor's law firm within the
purview of the rule when he was allegedly defamed by an opposition
candidate. 0 An internationally renowned columnist who had com-
mented on matters of public concern was required to prove "actual
malice" in his attempt to recover for alleged defamation 1
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co.12 is the most significant
post-New York Times lower court decision. Linus Pauling, a Nobel
Prize winning chemist of international repute, made efforts to promote
a nuclear test ban treaty. Defendant newspaper published allegedly
defamatory material about Pauling. The Eighth Circuit conceded that
Pauling dearly was not a public official. Nevertheless, "by his public
statements and actions, [he projected] ... himself into the arena of pub-
lic controversy and into the very 'vortex of the discussion of a question
of pressing public concern.' "-13 It was apparent that Pauling was better
equipped to influence public policy than a minor public official. The
court reasoned that since the New York Times rule was applicable to a
minor public official, it must also be applied to a public figure like
Pauling.
While many lower courts have taken the initiative in holding
public persons and public issues within the scope of New York Times,
others have been more hesitant and have refused to extend the decision
beyond its facts pending a further pronouncement from the Supreme
American tradition, is fast disappearing." Douglas, The Attack on the Right to Privacy,
PLAYBoY, Dec. 1967, at 189.
7 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558, 559 (7th Cir. 1965).
8 McNabb v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 400 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1965).
9 State v. Browne, 86 N.J. Super. 217, 220, 206 A.2d 591, 592 (App. Div. 1965).
10 Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 520, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (2d Dep't 1964).
11 Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alas. 1966).
12 862 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967).
13 Id. at 195. Pauling testified before congressional committees, circulated a petition
to the United Nations among the world's most eminent scientists, and sued to enjoin the
Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission from detonating nuclear
weapons. Id. at 190-91.
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Court.14 New York courts refused to apply New York Times to a
well known ex-prizefighter accused of using "loaded gloves" to win the
heavyweight championship, 15 and to a renowned baseball pitcher whose
purported biography was "fictionalized" for a juvenile readership.16
Both courts held that even though a legitimate public interest was
present, plaintiffs should not be required to prove "actual malice"
merely because they were public individuals. A celebrated New York
case, Youssoupoff v. C.B.S., Inc.,1 decided that a Russian Prince, suing
under the New York right-of-privacy statute,18 did not come within the
scope of New York Times. The Youssoupoff case received support when
a federal district court decided that New York Times does not apply to
public figures, public officials, or political candidates in foreign
countries.' 9
II
DR. MEIKL.JOHN AND THE SUPREME COURT
The post-New York Times Supreme Court cases cannot fully be
understood without first considering the philosophy of Dr. Alexander
Meiklejohn,20 since his works have had a profound influence on the
first amendment decisions of the current Supreme Court bench.21
Professor Meiklejohn's views are premised upon the observation that
the citizens of the United States are not only "the governed," but also
"the governors." The people delegate a portion of their sovereign power
to their government; voting is primary among those powers retained
by the people. The function of the first amendment is to prevent the
14 [A] considerable number of state and lower federal courts [have] . . . produced
a sharp division of opinion as to whether the New York Times rule should apply
only in actions brought by public officials or whether it has a longer reach.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967).
15 Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 755, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mem., 22 App. Div. 2d 854, 254 N.Y.S2d 80 (1st Dep't 1964).
16 Spalm v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 220, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (Sup. Ct.
1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (lst Dep't 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324,
221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated and remanded per curiam, 387 U.S. 239
(1967).
17 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
18 N. Y. Civ. RinGs LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948).
19 Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
20 This discussion of Dr. Meildejohn's philosophy is derived from A. MmKLEJOHN,
POLiTicAL Fanmoss (1960), and Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, in 1961
Sup. CT. RIv. 245.
21 See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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abridgment of the freedom of the electoral power of the people. Free-
dom of expression must be encouraged in all areas of thought, since
only in an atmosphere characterized by the free exchange of ideas and
feelings can the individual members of society become knowledgeable,
intelligent, sensitive "governors." Democracy requires unrestricted
public discussion of public issues. The range pf uninhibited communi-
cation must include education, in all its phases, as well as the achieve-
ments of philosophy, literature, and the arts and sciences.
-- Dr. Meiklejohn's concept of the first amendment freedoms of
speech and press is plainly "issue" rather than "person" oriented. The
paramount consideration is neither the speaker's nor the subject's role
in society, but rather whether the statement in any way makes the
hearer a more effective "governor." There are very few statements that
do not contribute in some way toward this goal. Assuming the Court's
thinking was significantly shaped by Professor Meiklejohn's philosophy,
the "public official" and "official conduct" limitations of the New York
Times rule were never intended to canalize the future development of
defamation and invasion of privacy cases. Although New York Times
involved a statement regarding the official conduct of an elected public
official, the early commentators confidently predicted that the an-
nounced standard was merely a starting point for a much more per-
vasive rule.22
- In Garrison v. Louisiana,23 decided several months after the pro-
mulgation of the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court ex-
tended New York Times into the area of criminal libel. "'[W]e see no
merit in the argument that criminal libel statutes serve interests dis-
tinct from those secured by civil libel laws, and therefore should not
be subject to the same limitations."24 Rosenblatt v. Baer25 was the next
of the first amendment defamation cases to reach the Court. Baer, a
former supervisor of a county recreation area, recovered damages from
the defendant columnist for an alleged civil libel, the New Hampshire
22 See, e.g., Notes, Constitutional Law-Defamation-Actual Malice, 44 BosToN U.L.
REv. 563, 568 (1964), Free Speech and Defamation of Public Persons: The Expanding
Doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 419 (1967), Torts: Trial
Court Difficulties in Applying the New Rule of Fair Mistake to Civil Libel, 48 MARQ. L.
REv. 128 (1964), Privilege To Defame: The United States Supreme Court Has Established
a New and Important Area of Constitutional Law, 26 MONT. L. REV. 110, 117 (1964),
Privilege To Criticize Public Officials: A Constitutional Extension, 38 S. CAL. L. REy.
349, 354 (1965), First Amendment Requires Qualified Privilege To Publish Defamatory
Misstatements About Public Officials, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 284, 287 (1964).
23 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
24 Id. at 67 (footnote omitted). The district attorney of New Orleans accused the
eight judges of the Criminal District Court of the Parish of New Orleans of being
ineffective, lazy, and sympathetic to violators of the vice laws. Id. at 66.
25 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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Supreme Court expressly holding lew York Times inapplicable. 26 The
Supreme Court reversed.2T Fated with the need for further definition
of "public official," the Court stated:
[T]he "public official" desighation applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who haVe, or appear
to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over
the conduct of governmental affairs. 28
In three 1967 decisions, 29 tht Court explicitly abandoned the
"public official" and "official conduct" rubric of Ne) York Times. In
Time, Inc. v. Hill,30 the Court all but adopted the Meiklejoht philo-
sophy by holding that the constitution requires the New York right of
privacy statute to be tempered by the '"actual fnalice" restriction of
New York Times Where the allegedly libelous material concerned
"matters of public interest." 3' Hill, however, does not necessarily mark
a complete abdication of the Court's person-oriehted view of the
freedom of expression. Lurking in the background of the opinion is
the fact that the members of the Hill family had "involuntarily [be-
come] the subjects of a front-page news story."32 Hence, the issue of
public personage may remain a significant ingredient in the first
amendment defamation cases. An important question, unanswered at
present, is whether the Court would apply New York Times in the Hill
context absent the public personage catalyst. It is unlikely that the
Court would do so, especially in light of two post-Hill cases, Curtis
Publishing Co. v. ButtsZ3 and Associated Press v. Walker,34 in which
the Court clearly reverted to its peson orientation by deciding the
cases on a "public figures" rather than "public issues" rationale.
A. The Effect of Time, Inc. v. Hill
In September, 1952, the James Hill family was involuntarily thrust
into the public limelight. For nineteen hours, three escaped convicts
held the Hills hostage in their suburban Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania,
26 Baer v. kosenblattj 106 N.H. 26, 94, 203 A.2d 773, 780 (1964).
27 Rosenbhttt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). The case was remanded for consideration
of three issues unanswered by the record: whether the column specifically concerned the
plaintiff; whether plaintiff might be able to establish that he was not a "public official"
and, therefore, outside the New York Times rule; and whether there was "actual malice."
Id. at 87.
28 383 U.S. at 85 (footnote omitted).
29 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, decided with Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.
130, 155 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967).
30 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
81 Id. at 387-88.
32 Id. at 378.
33 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
34 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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home. When the convicts departed, the press arrived. While recounting
the experience, Hill emphasized that no member of his family had been
harmed during the incident and that, in fact, they had been treated
courteously by the convicts. In order to avoid unwanted publicity, the
family abandoned the Whitemarsh area and moved to Connecticut.
Three years after the Hill incident, "The Desperate Hours"
opened on the Philadelphia stage. The play portrayed a harrowing en-
counter suffered by the Hilliards while being held captive in their sub-
urban home by three escaped convicts. Unlike the Hills, the Hilliards
were brutally maltreated. After the play's opening, Life published an
article, "True Crime Inspires Tense Play," which referred to the play
as a "re-enactment" of the Hill experience. Hill brought suit against
the publisher under the New York right-of-privacy statute,85 and the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in his favor.80 Relying
on New York Times, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that
the opening of a new play is a matter of public interest8 7
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press
preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth.
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of
political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as
those are to healthy government .... We have no doubt that the
subject of the Life article, the opening of a new play linked to an
actual incident, is a matter of public interest.38
Thus, the Court rid the New York Times rule of the "public offi-
cial" and "official conduct" shackles. Under Hill, the test hinges on
whether the actionable statement concerns a matter of public interest.
The case thus represents a giant step toward the adoption of the
Meiklejohn theory of the first amendment. The Court protected not
only the right of Life to publish, even carelessly, material about a the-
atrical event, but also the right of the reading public, the "voter-gov-
ernors," to read the expressed views. Also, the Court, for the first time,
35 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTrs LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948).
386 Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), aff'g mem. 14
Misc. 2d 249, 155 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
37 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 885 U.S. 374 (1967). The case was remanded for further jury
consideration on the issue of actual malice. The Court found that the evidence presented
was sufficient to support a jury finding of either actual malice, negligence, or innocent
misstatement. Since the jury had not been properly instructed on the question of actual
malice, a new trial was necessary. Id. at 891.
88 Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
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applied the constitutional standards previously employed in defama-
tion cases to an invasion of privacy action.39
B. Butts and Walker
Declaring that they provided an opportunity to delineate the sweep
of the New York Times rule, the Supreme Court considered Butts40
and Walker 1 together. Butts grew out of "The Story of College Foot-
ball Fix," an article published in defendant's Saturday Evening Post.42
The article accused plaintiff, athletic director and former football coach
at the University of Georgia, of conspiring to fix the 1962 Georgia-
Alabama football game. The story was based on an alleged telephone
conversation in which Butts outlined Georgia's game plan to "Bear"
Bryant, head football coach of the University of Alabama. After the
publication of the article, Butts resigned his post at the University of
Georgia and commenced a libel suit in the federal district court in
Georgia, seeking ten million dollars compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.43 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in excess of three
million dollars. The judge reduced the recovery to $460,000 by re-
mittitur. The Fifth Circuit affirmed,44 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.40
The Walker case arose out of the racial tempest that swept the
University of Mississippi campus on the night of September 30, 1962,
when federal troops sought to secure the enrollment of James Meredith,
a Negro. Associated Press dispatched a report asserting that retired
General Edwin A. Walker, who was in fact present throughout the
tumult, "had taken command of the violent crowd and had personally
led a charge against federal marshals sent there to effectuate the court's
decree and to assist in preserving order."46 Walker was also described
as "encouraging rioters to use violence and giving them technical advice
on combating the effects of tear gas." 47 Walker brought an action for
libel in the Texas state courts seeking two million dollars compensatory
and punitive damages. The jury awarded him $500,000 compensatory
and $300,000 punitive damages. The judge, finding no evidence of
39 Justice Douglas has said that "[f]reedom of speech has an aura of privacy." Douglas,
supra note 6, at 189.
40 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
41 Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
42 SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Mar. 23, 1963, at 80.
43 Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
44 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
45 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 385 U.S. 811 (1966).
46 388 U.S. at 140.
47 Id.
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actual malice, limited the recovery to the amount of the compensatory
award.48 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 49 After the Su-
preme Court of Texas denied a writ of error, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.50
In four separate opinions Butts was affirmed by a five-to-four de-
cision, while Walker was reversed unanimously. 1 Since no more than
four justices concurred in any opinion, it is difficult to glean a "ma-
jority rationale" for the decisions.0 2 Five justices, in three separate
opinions, decided that New York Times applies to public figures. Four
others favored a modified New York Times rule applicable to "public
figures" who are not "public officials."
Justice Harlan, announcing the judgments of the court, but actu-
ally espousing a minority rationale, favored a new test designed for
"public figures" who are not "public officials."
[A] "public figure" who is not a public official may . . . recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers.53
48 Id. at 141-42.
49 Associated Press v. Walker, 593 S.W.2d 671 (rex. Civ. App. 1965).
50 Associated Press v. Walker, 385 U.S. 812 (1966).
51 The Court distinguished the cases, in part, on the evidence of "actual malice."
Whereas the reporter in Walker was a reliable correspondent of the defendant, the in-
former in Butts was an unknown who "had been placed on probation in connection with
bad check charges." 388 U.S. at 157. In addition, Curtis failed to investigate the suspicious
report. Though the Walker story was "hot news," of value only if dispatched instantly,
the Butts report, not received until after the game, was of a different character. Curti
could have afforded the time to investigate the story, whereas Associated Press could not.
Id. Finally, it was shown that "[tihe Saturday Evening Post was anxious to change
its image by instituting a policy of 'sophisticated muckraking,' and the pressure to pro-
duce a successful expos6 might have induced a stretching of ftandards." Id. at 158.
52 Justice Harlan announced the judgments of the Court in what was actually the
minority opinion. Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas concurred with Justice Harlan. The
opinion applied a somewhat modified New York Times rule to "public figures" who are
not "public officials." The remainder of the bench agreed that the New York Times
standard should be applied to "public figures" in toto. On the basis of this rationale,
the Chief Justice was able to concur in the results reached by Jtstice Harlan. Justice
Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred in the reversal of Walker but would have
likewise reversed Butts. He reiterhted his belief that the New York Times decision is an
inadequate statement of first amendment freedoms. Justice Brenan, the author of the
New York Times rule, agreed to reverse Walker but would also have reversed aid re-
manded Butts in order that the jury might be properly instructed in accordance with
New York Times. He did not think the jury was adequately charged, and therefore
believed the Court was invading the province of the jury by holding that Butts had met
the test of New York Times. Justice White concurred in this opinion.
53 888 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added).
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It is difficult to perceive what Harlan's test adds to the New YPrA Times
standard. One would be hard pressed to find a case in which a publisher
demonstrated "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publisher&" gnd yet did not act "with reckless
disregard of whether [the statement] was false or not."
In a separate opinion, the Chief Justice announced the rule
ctuai~y adhered to by a majority of the Court-i.e., that the New York
Times standard should be applied to "public figures." He refused to
accept Justice Harlan's "public figure" standard.
I cannot believe that a standard which is based on such an unusual
and uncertain formulation could either guide a jury of laymen or
afford the protection for speech and debate that is fundamental to
our society and guaranteed by the First Amendment.54
In 1964 the Supreme Court announced a rule imposing constitu-
tional restrictions on the right of an individual to maintain a defama-
tion action. The rule as then articulated was narrowly confined to in-
dude only an action commenced by a "public official" with regard to
a statement made about his "official conduct." In each of the four cases
heard since New York Times, the court has expanded the rule far
enough to envelop the facts involved. By including 'public figures"
within the purview of New York Times, the Court has established
precedent capable of including virtually any set of facts. If James Hill,
held captive in his home by escaped convicts, was "involuntarily thrust
into the public limelight,"55 and if General Walker, by his presence on
a university campus during a racial disturbance, "thrust himself into
the 'vortex' of the controversy,"'56 then any person who makes a
significant comment about an issue of public concern, or invites such
comment, may be held to have "thrust" himself into the public view
and to have become a "public figure."
Despite the potential scope of the enlarged New York Times rule, "
at least two types of defamation are presently untouched: the statement
made or invited by the totally non-public individual on a subject of
public concern, and all private defamations and invasions of privacy.
Even a complete acceptance of the Meiklejohn theory need never reach
the latter type of statement, which neither aids our American demo-
cratic system nor enlightens its voter-governors. It is the treatment of
54 Id. at 163.
55 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1966).
56 Curtis Publishing Co. v. .uttp, 388 U.S. 130, 146 (1966). With respect to distin-
guishing this case fom Wlkvr, see note 5! suprp.
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the former type of statement, made or invited by the non-public indi-
vidual concerning a public issue, that will determine where the Court
draws the line. If such statements were protected, the press would be
veiled with an unconditional license, except where the plaintiff can
prove actual malice. Such a result might endanger rather than promote
free speech. If the press is given free rein to comment on anyone who
enters the public arena, however unobtrusively, as by writing a letter to
the editor of the New York Times, 57 fewer people will be moved to so
enter the arena. The Court's apparent assumption that the first amend-
ment freedoms of the press and of speech are one is unrealistic, es-
pecially today when the publishing industry is to a large extent con-
trolled by a few multibillion dollar organizations. An individual de-
famed by today's press is defamed before an audience of millions.
Perhaps two centuries ago he could resurrect his good name by proving
his rectitude to. his fellow parishioners, but today his voice will not
carry far enough. The Court must recognize that too free a press will
only serve to stifle free speech.
III
DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY-A JuDcCIrA. QUAGMIRE
The Hill case, read concurrently with Butts and Walker, manifests
the Court's design to equate privacy and defamation actions within the
realm of first amendment guarantees. Whereas defamation had a long
history under the jurisdiction of the seignorial and ecclesiastical tri-
bunals prior to its assimiiation by the common law courts in the six-
teenth century, privacy, as a cause of action, is essentially a creation of
the twentieth century.58 The celebrated 1890 law review article by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"59
is generally credited with originating the right.60 Whereas the defama-
tion action primarily protects one's reputation, the right to privacy
secures peace of mind and protects "an inviolate personality." 61 The
right to be free from invasions of privacy, or, in the famous words of
57 The possibility that a letterwriter "invites public judgment" was suggested by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Afro-American Publishing Co. v.
Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1960). "[Plaintiff] in no sense mounted a public rostrum,
not even by a letter expressly or implicitly intended for publication." Id. at 657.
58 See W. PROSSER, ToRTs §§ 106-12 (3d ed. 1964).
59 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
60 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REV. 883 (1960).
61 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Ray. 193, 205 (1890).
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Judge Cooley, the right "to be let alone," 62 is today one of the least
understood areas of the law. It has been likened to a "haystack in a
hurricane." 63
In an effort to clear the muddy waters, Dean Prosser has defined
the right to privacy in terms of four distinct torts:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plain-
,tiff's name or likeness.64
Prosser, among others,65 has suggested the possibility that the third
element of privacy, false light in the public eye, may be capable of
"swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation."066
But probably this is merely a function of Prosser's definition. Afro-
American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe67 should serve to placate Prosser's
fears. Plaintiff commenced an action for libel and for invasion of
privacy arising out of a single publication. The district court awarded
plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. The award was
based on both the libel and the invasion of privacy counts. The court of
appeals reversed the lower court's judgment on the privacy issue, but
upheld the compensatory award on the ground that the plaintiff had a
valid defamation action. 68 The court concluded that Jaffe had not
"mounted a public rostrum" and was, therefore, not required by New
York Times to prove "actual malice."
It would appear that privacy and defamation, at least for the
62 T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
63 Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
64 Prosser, supra note 60, at 389. See also W. PRosSrn, supra note 58, § 112, at 832-44.
65 E.g., Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. RF-v. 1093, 1121
(1962).
66 Prosser, supra note 60, at 401.
67 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Plaintiff, a Washington, D.C., pharmacist, maintained
a newsstand for publications of interest to Negro readers. Though white himself, all of
Jaffe's employees and about 80% of his customers were Negro. Believing that defendant's
newspaper, Afro, was spreading racial hatred, plaintiff cancelled his handling of the Afro.
Thereafter, defendant's manager and editor published an editorial about Jaffe's refusal to
handle Afro. The column attributed racial bigotry to the plaintiff. Id. at 652-53.
68 Although his interest in privacy for his actions and racial sentiments did not
give plaintiff an immunity from public discussion, he had, we think, a right to
responsible newspaper discussion, which does not descend to the level of false,
defamatory statements.
Id. at 654.
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present time, are to continue as distinct, though related, torts. Never-
theless, the Supreme Cotrt has equated them for constitutional pur-
poses. This approach is not only logical, but imperative. The cases
must be considered not from the defendant speaker's or the plaintiff
subject's point of view, but rather in terms of society's need to hear the
statement, since this is what the first amendment was designed to
protect. From this perspective, it makes no difference whether an action
is stated in terms of defamation or invasion of privacy.
IV
THE "MoRs TEST"
It is difficult to reconcile the different results reached in Hill and
Butts. To distinguish the cases on the ground that the former was a
privacy action while the latter was a defamation suit would add nothing
to our understanding of the law. The cases can be differentiated on
their facts only by accepting the Court's position that the quantum of
proof of "actual malice" was greater in Butts than in Hill. An examina-
tion of the record in each of these cases, however, renders such explana-
tion unsatisfactory.
Perhaps what the Court really had in mind when it chose to affirm
Butts and to remand Hill was a "mores test."0 9 The "mores test" makes
recovery for public defamation and invasion of privacy easier as the
publicity complained of becomes increasingly objectionable to the
public ethic. Standing alone, the test provides an insufficient basis for
either granting or denying recovery to a defamed plaintiff. It is, how-
ever, an element of some magnitude that cannot be overlooked in the
Court's delicate balance between reputation and the first amendment.
On the basis of the "mores" formula, Butts could recover more easily
than Hill, because the publicity of which he complained accused him
of conduct cutting across the very fibre of the American ethic. The
publicity objected to by Hill, on the other hand, was in no sense de-
famatory or degrading by the socially accepted standards of propriety.
Several cases can be juxtaposed to demonstrate the foundation and
application of the "mores test." Melvin v. Reid70 was an invasion of
privacy action stemming out of a motion picture, "The Red Kimono,"
based on the true story of the life of Gabrielle Darley Melvin, who had
69 The "mores test" was suggested by te lower cpurt in Si4is v. F-R Publishing Corp.,
34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), qfl'di 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940), and is discussed by Dean Prosser in his article, supra note 60, at 396-97.
70 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
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gained considerable notoriety as a prostitute and as the defendant in a
spectacular murder trial. Six years prior to the production of the movie
plaintiff married and abandoned her previous way of life. As a married
woman, Mrs. Melvin led a virtuous life and became a respected member
of her community. When "The Red Kimono" was released, plaintiff's
unsavory past was, for the first timej revealed to her friends and ac-
quaintances. Though the court refused to recognize an actionable inva-
sion of privacy under these facts, it reversed a judgment for the defen-
dant on the basis of plaintiff's fundamental "right to pursue and obtain
safety and happiness without improper infringements thereon by
others."71
Compare Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp7 2 In 1910, William James
Sidis was recognized as a child prodigy At the age of sixteen he gradu-
ated from Harvard amid considerable public attention, Five years
earlier, he had lectured to a group of distinguished mathematicians on
the fourth dimension. Immediately after his graduation, he abandoned
all pursuit of academics and sought to lead a secluded life. He succeeded
in avoiding the public limelight for more than a decade until the New
Yorker magazine printed the article that gave rise to the privacy action.
The article traced Sidis's past and examined his present mode of living
in great detail. Even though the article was "merciless in its dissection
of intimate details of its subject's personal life,"& 7 3 the court refused to
find an actionable invasion of privacy. Mel-din and Sidi can be legiti-
mately distinguished only on the basis of the "mores test."
Perhaps the dearest illustration of the "mores test" in action can
be derived from consideration of the twko famous Gill cases.74 Plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Gill, owned and opeiated a concession in the Farmers'
Market in Los Angeles, where they enjoyed n excellent reputation.
Defendant photographed plaintiffs embracing in the market place. This
photograph was published in the Ladies Home Journal in connection
with an article entitled "Love," which implied that the persons depicted
in the picture were exhibiting the "wrong kind of love." In Gill v.
Hearst Publishing Co.,"5 a privacy suit, plaintiffs alleged all the above
facts except that concerning the "wrong kind of love." The court held.
that because the picture depicted a pose voluntarily assumed by the
Gills in a public place, and because the photograph was not taken sur-
71 Id. at 291, 297 P. at 93.
72 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 US. 711 (1940).
73 Id. at 807.
74 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Gill v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
75 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
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reptitiously, the complaint failed to state a cause of action. In Gill v.
Curtis Publishing Co.,76 another privacy action stemming out of the
same publication of the same photograph, plaintiff alleged the in-
nuendo concerning the "wrong kind of love" and the same court held
that the complaint stated a valid cause of action. Without resort to the
cmores test," the Gill cases are difficult to reconcile.
The "mores test" performs a legitimate function in the constitu-
ttional law of defamation and privacy. The decisions in this area are the
product of a balancing process performed by the Court, by which the
interests of society in the freedom of expression have been determined
to outweigh those of the individual in the preservation of his reputation
and his "inviolate personality." Nevertheless, in those rare instances in
which the individual prevails, the degree to which the publicity offends
the public morality must play an important role in tipping the scales
in his favor. There is little purpose in depriving society of the right to
hear a statement when that same society does not consider the plaintiff
damaged by it.
CONCLUSION
The rule announced four years ago in New York Times, protect-
ing those who defame without "actual malice," has been freed from
the narrow confines of statements concerning the "official conduct" of
"public officials" to include comments about "public figures." Further-
more, the Court, quite properly, has decided to apply the same constitu-
tional standards to invasion of privacy actions as were previously em-
ployed in defamation cases. Thus, the Court has given the first
amendment an interpretation that allows the "voter-governors" to
hear more than ever before. They are, however, in danger of being
stifled by the tyranny of a licentious press. If the "public figure" label
is expanded beyond Hill, Butts, and Walker, the press will be the re-
cipient of a nearly unrestricted license against which the "mores test"
and the "actual malice" doctrine will afford little protection. Just as
the former is nebulous and undependable, the latter, created by a bench
seeking to protect the press, will probably prove inadequate. The Court
will soon be forced to define the limits of "public figure." There is only
one way properly to strike a balance between the first amendment
freedoms of speech and press, and the common law protections of
privacy, name, and reputation-very carefully.
Lawrence D. Eisenberg
76 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
